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The Second Amendment, Incorporation and the
Right to Self Defense
by Jason Bentley*

T

I. Introduction

he District of Columbia v. Heller shot off the next round of
gun litigation in the twenty-first century. The landmark case
said the Second Amendment codified an individual’s right
to have a gun (specifically a handgun) in the home for self defense,
and struck down a longstanding ban on handguns in the District
of Columbia.1 Chicago’s gun ban would be the next target for gun
rights groups since Chicago’s ban is virtually identical to the D.C.
law that was ruled unconstitutional. Hours after the Heller decision,
Otis McDonald and other petitioners sued Chicago, saying that the
Heller decision meant they, as U.S. citizens, also had a right to own
handguns. Although Heller and McDonald v. Chicago both deal
with the constitutionality of handgun bans, the constitutional roads
to reach a decision in these cases couldn’t be more divergent. While
Heller dealt primarily with interpreting the Second Amendment, the
McDonald decision will hang on the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2
Although the Court already ruled that citizens under federal jurisdiction, like the District of Columbia, have a right to keep a handgun
in their homes as a right of citizenship, the Court did not explicitly
extend that right to be enforced against states and local governments.
*
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The reason the Court needed to explicitly specify when a part of the
Bill of Rights applied to state and local governments was because
originally the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government
and a state was free to ignore the provisions it didn’t like. However,
in the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has used a process known
as incorporation to deal with this issue. Incorporation is when the
justices use the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to implement specific provisions in the Bill of Rights to apply at the state
level and not just the federal. Currently, there are few rights recognized in the Bill of Rights that haven’t been incorporated, namely the
Second and Third Amendments, as well as the right to be indicted by
a grand jury for high crimes in the Fifth Amendment.
When legal scholars and pundits debate the issue of incorporation
it often gets heated because it strikes at one of the most fundamental
issues in constitutional reasoning: where is the line drawn between
the people’s right to write their own laws through their elected representatives and those rights which individuals retain that no government has a right to violate, even if that government is democratically
appointed? In essence the Court must asnwer whether popular sovereignty trumps Second Amendment rights or vice-a-versa? To answer
this question, this paper will first briefly examine the history of the
Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to give context
to the case. Second, it will examine past judicial formulas used to
determine whether an aspect of the Bill of Rights ought to be incorporated to give a means of judging the merits of McDonald’s claims.
Finally, it argues that all past judicial formulas require that the Court
rule in favor of Otis McDonald and the right of all citizens to own a
handgun in their home.

II. History
A. Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms, the Militia, and
Self Defense
Most controversy surrounding the Second Amendment prior to
Heller concerned whether the Amendment only protected the use
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of firearms in militia service or whether it also included the right to
own firearms for personal defense. Originally the Second Amendment was ratified specifically to ensure that the people could form
a militia3 because the founding generation was suspicious of standing armies. They feared that a professional army supported by the
government during peacetime would eventually abuse its power, as
they perceived the British army did just before the Revolutionary
War. Thus, Americans saw standing armies, even if raised by their
own government, as a threat to liberty.4 Instead, they wanted to entrust the people5 themselves with the duty and the right of defending their own liberties with their own arms.6 Beyond these duties,
the militia also maintained security against local threats, such as
bandits, pirates, and Native Americans.7 With time, Americans became increasingly more comfortable with government-run standing
armies, and today many people consider soldiers in standing armies
to be performing the most patriotic service imaginable. Regardless
of modern attitudes towards militias and standing armies, these concepts must be understood in order to understand why the Second
Amendment was seen as necessary in the first place.

3

It’s interesting to note that this is agreed upon by all sides, as can be seen
in the Heller case itself. The dispute comes over the nature of the militia,
as well as whether or not the “right of the people to keep and bear arms”
extends beyond militia service. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801, contra id.
2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately, early nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions do not shed much light on how to properly interpret the Second
Amendment since there were no cases that went to the nation’s highest court until after the Civil War.8 This is not surprising since, at the
time, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government and
had no power over the states.9 Cases addressing the right to keep and
bear arms were dealt with at the state level, and state courts generally used that specific state’s Bill of Rights—and not the U.S. Constitution—to come to a decision, even though most decisions generally
favored an individual rights interpretation.10
However, the understanding of what it meant to keep and bear
arms changed significantly by the Civil War and the years following.
Americans no longer feared standing armies and thus were much
less enthusiastic about militias than the founding generation.11 In the
Reconstruction Era, arms bearing was no longer seen through the
prism of maintaining liberty against tyrants and standing armies,
but as maintaining safety and protection against private threats like
mobs and bandits. The right to firearms was also a civil rights issue
because many blacks in the South were being denied that right and
were often helpless against groups like the KKK. To help remedy the
problem, the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment and a series of laws like the Freedmen’s Bureau Act to protect
the right of blacks to keep and bear arms.12
Additionally, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment also
put restrictions on states that had previously only applied to the
federal government,13 thus allowing litigation involving the Second Amendment to be taken to the Supreme Court. The first major
Second Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court asked if the
8	Doherty, supra note 6, at 12—13.
9
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Fourteenth Amendment applied to conspiracies and mobs, which
threatened to take away life, liberty, or property, or if it only applied
to state governments. In 1873, a white mob surrounded a church in
Colfax, Louisiana, where a predominantly black group had taken
refuge with arms. The mob ordered those in the church to hand over
their arms and later opened fire, killing over a hundred black men.
Although originally nine men were charged in the incident, they
were all eventually released after the Supreme Court ruled in their
favor in United States v. Cruikshank. The Court decided that neither
the First nor Second Amendments applied to states and even struck
down provisions in certain civil rights bills passed by Congress.14
The next major case involving the Second Amendment was
Presser v. Illinois. Herman Presser, an Illinois citizen, had organized
and led a militia made up of mostly ethnic German workers who
were associated with the Socialist Labor Party. Presser was accused
of drilling and marching a militia without a license issued by the
governor. Presser appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds
that the law violated his Second Amendment rights; however, the
Court followed the precedence set in Cruikshank, reaffirming that
the Second Amendment did not apply to states and requiring Presser
to submit to state law.15
The issue of whether the Second Amendment protected a right
to self defense was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1939
in U.S. v. Miller, and even then, only indirectly. Miller challenged
the National Firearms Act which required that all automatic weapons and sawed off-shotguns to be registered and taxed.16 When Jack
Miller and Frank Layton were arrested on the charges of possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, they sued, claiming that the
NFA violated their Second Amendment right.17 But the Supreme
Court upheld the NFA, declaring that the Second Amendment did
not protect sawed-off shotguns because they were not used for mi14	Halbrook, supra note 12, 173—75; Presser v. Illinois 116 U.S., 252, 265
(1886).
15
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litia service.18 Because the case didn’t give much analysis to the
Second Amendment, its history, and its proper interpretation, the
implications of the decision were so vague that gun rights advocates
and gun control supporters later both claimed the case supported
their position on the issue. Gun rights advocates said although Miller
did the NFA, it was reasonable to uphold that specific restriction
because the firearm in question could not be used for militia service.
They further argued that had the restriction been placed on arms
needed for a militia the Court would have found such a measure
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, Gun control proponents said Miller
showed that the Second Amendment only protected a right to weapons used in military service. While gun rights activists believed the
firearm in question was the key to determining the constitutionality of a gun restriction, gun control advocates believed the decision
said that the arm bearer had to be involved in some sort of military
service to have a Second Amendment right. Following the Miller
decision, lower courts generally sided with the latter interpretation
of the Second Amendment.19
Heller provided the analysis that Miller lacked, and ruled that
the Second Amendment protects both militia service and an individual right to own a gun. First, the Court found that the preamble
of the amendment, “A well regulated militia, being necessary for the
security of a Free State,” did not limit the operative clause that “the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”
Beyond just providing analysis of the original Second Amendment,
Heller interpreted the Miller decision to mean that individuals did
have a right to own guns, just not guns that would be useful for militia service.20 Ultimately the case ruled that the Second Amendment
did codify an individual right to keep and bear arms for self defense
and struck down the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns.21

18

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).

19

Doherty, supra note 6, at 18—19.

20

Heller, 128 S. Ct., at 2815—17.

21

Id. at 2882.
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B. Incorporation
Heller left a major question asked but unanswered: if the right to
bear arms is an individual right, should state and local governments
also have to respect it?22
As was stated above, the original Bill of Rights was designed to
limit the federal government. Early in the nineteenth century, there
was some dispute whether aspects of the Bill of Rights should be
incorporated using the “privileges and immunities of citizenship”
clause in the Constitution.23 The Supreme Court, however, ruled in
1833 that the Bill of Rights was meant only to restrict the federal government. If the founders wanted to restrict the states, Chief
Justice James Marshall reasoned, they would have specifically said
so. Thus, states, and more pertinent to our case, local governments
could ban weapons.24
But the Fourteenth Amendment changed the relationship between states and the federal government demanding that certain
rights of citizenship be respected at the state level as well. Now, “no
state shall make…any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities” of citizenship. Nor could they take “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”25
Unfortunately, the case that defined what the Fourteenth Amendment meant virtually left the privileges or immunities clause useless. The Supreme Court ruled in Slaughterhouse that the Fourteenth
Amendment only protected a very limited set of rights of citizenship.26
The next major blow to those who believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to protect individuals from state abuse was United

22

Id. at 2811.

23

David R. Upham, Protecting the Privliges and Immunities: Founding
Civil War and Reconstruction, in Challenges to the American Founding
141-45 (Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West eds., 2005).

24

Amar, supra 11, at 160-161

25

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

26

Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, at 67 (1873)
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States v. Cruikshank, which reaffirmed that the Bill of Rights (specifically the First and Second Amendments) did not apply to states.27
Eventually, the Court began to acknowledge that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected more than the very limited rights enumerated
in Slaughterhouse. But in the 1950s, Justice Hugo Black argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment did incorporate the first eight amendments.28 Although the court never embraced Justice Black’s view of
mechanically incorporating the entire Bill of Rights, it did change its
attitude towards incorporation in general. During the Warren Court,
practically all of the Bill of Rights was incorporated one right at a
time under the doctrine of selective incorporation, which in essence
says that the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights.29
Today, virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been incorporated, with
a few exceptions, including the right to keep and bear arms.

III. Incorporation and the Chicago case
A. Current Case
The heart of the McDonald case isn’t about what the Second
Amendment means. Rather the case is about whether the Fourteenth
Amendment requires cities like Chicago to allow their citizens to
own handguns. The Heller decision itself acknowledged both Cruikshank and Presser as saying the Second Amendment didn’t apply
to states, although it neither outright rejected nor endorsed the precedent set by their decisions. Rather, the opinion recognized that the
issue would probably find its way back to the Supreme Court, but
that the court did not feel it necessary to rule on the matter since it
had no direct relation to the Heller case.30
27

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552—54 (1875).

28

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (5-4 decision) (Justice
Black, H., dissenting).

29

Amar, supra note 11, at 139.

30

Heller, 128 S. Ct., at 2823.
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As noted in the introduction, shortly after the Heller decision was
announced, McDonald was filed challenging the city of Chicago’s
authority to ban handguns.31 The Seventh Circuit Court ruled in favor
of Chicago because it felt that it was not the place of a circuit court
to incorporate anything (since its jurisdiction was limited) and also
because precedent clearly favored the view that the Second Amendment only applied to the federal government and not to the states.32
The Supreme Court has now decided to hear the case, thus leaving the Seventh Court’s first concern resolved. The Supreme Court
now is left with the second question: should the right to self defense
be incorporated against Chicago or should it follow Cruikshank and
only apply to the federal government?
B. Different Criteria for Incorporation
There have traditionally been three different methods to incorporation: the fundamental fairness approach, selective incorporation, and mechanical incorporation. The mechanical incorporation
approach was championed by Justice Hugo Black, and is based primarily on his textual and historical analysis that the writers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had intended to incorporate the first eight
amendments to the Bill of Rights.33 The second is the fundamental
fairness doctrine which says that the Fourteenth Amendment has
no relation to the Bill of Rights. Rather, it simply protects citizens
in those rights which are fundamental to ordered liberty.34 The final
and thus far the most used is selective incorporation. It disagrees
with the total incorporation in that it concedes that the first eight
amendments are not necessarily incorporated across the board, but
says that some rights of the Bill of Rights certainly are incorporated
against the states.35
31

NRA v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 856 (2009)

32

Id. at 858.

33

Adamson, 332 U.S., at 89-91 (Black, H., dissenting)
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C. Applying McDonald to the Three Methodologies
According to any of the three traditional methods of incorporation the Second Amendment ought to be incorporated. First, any
judge or scholar who falls into the Hugo Black camp of total incorporation will believe the first Eight Amendments to the Constitution
ought to be incorporated outright. Although some may argue over
the meaning of the Second Amendment, unless the Court decides
to reverse its Heller decision it made just two years ago, total incorporation of the Second Amendment would require striking down
handgun laws across the country.
The same legal reasoning also follows using the selective incorporation model as well. The Court in Heller said the Second Amendment protected a pre-existing right and spent a great deal of the
opinion reviewing the history of how that right has been respected
throughout American history.36 Once a right is declared fundamental
it is extremely difficult to get the Court to reverse itself—especially
considering the Supreme Court declared the right to own a handgun
for self defense a fundamental right a mere two years ago.
The hardest judicial test for incorporating the Second Amendment is the fundamental fairness test. This requires proving a right
to be absolutely essential for ordered liberty, which is difficult to do
because what one judge might consider essential to ordered liberty
another may not. However, a closer look at congressional debates
of the Thirty Ninth Congress makes a very powerful case to incorporate the Second Amendment, even under the fundamental fairness test. Consider that proponents of the fundamental fairness test
advocate it because it protects the right of the people to write their
own laws through their elected representatives. The advantage to
this method has traditionally been seen as protecting the separation
of powers and the structural integrity of the Constitution. But even if
proponents of fundamental fairness don’t think the right to firearms
for defense is considered necessary to ordered liberty, certainly the
right to amend the Constitution is.

36

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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The right to firearms for self defense was discussed extensively
as a right which the Thirty-Ninth Congress considered to be a right
of citizenship and one which it wished to protect by the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment.37 This commitment to protecting the
right to keep and bear arms is not only seen in congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment but in laws passed in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The virtue of fundamental
fairness is that it properly acknowledges that some modern questions and dilemmas simply cannot be answered by the Fourteenth
Amendment since the authors themselves might not have considered
the problems we face now. And in such cases, caution and restraint
should be used. But the right of all citizens to bear arms—including groups that wouldn’t have been protected by the original Second
Amendment like blacks, women and men who weren’t part of any
militia—was discussed extensively as one of the fundamental rights
they wanted to protect. To fail to incorporate the right to arms for
self defense when there is compelling evidence that the writers and
people who ratified the Amendment specifically wanted it to be protected is to rob ordered liberty of one of its basic necessities: the right
of the people to amend the Constitution.

IV. Conclusion
Although the Court ought to side with Otis McDonald in this
case, it should be noted that this will not end all gun regulations in
the city. The Supreme Court specifically said in Heller that a right to
own a gun is not an absolute right. Cities and states will still retain
their right to regulate firearms in public buildings. It will still be up
to these local governments to regulate other issues like concealed
weapons permits. However, no government—federal, state, or local—has the right to take a citizen’s right to possess a handgun to
defend their family, property and own person within the walls of
their own home.
37
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